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Testing asymptomatic people for SARS-CoV-2 aims to reduce COVID-19
transmission. Screening programmes’ effectiveness depends upon testing
strategy, sample handling logistics, test sensitivity and individual behaviour,
in addition to dynamics of viral transmission. The interaction between these
factors is not fully characterized. We investigated the interaction between
these factors to determine how to optimize reduction of transmission. We
estimate that under idealistic assumptions 70% of transmission may be
averted, but under realistic assumptions only 7% may be averted. We
show that programmes that overwhelm laboratory capacity or reduce iso-
lation of those with minor symptoms have increased transmission
compared with those that do not: programmes need to be designed to
avoid these issues, or they will be ineffective or even counter-productive.
Our model allows optimal selection of whom to test, quantifies the balance
between accuracy and timeliness, and quantifies potential impacts of behav-
ioural interventions. We anticipate our model can be used to understand
optimal screening strategies for other infectious diseases with substantially
different dynamics.1. Background
Repeatedly screening asymptomatic individuals for SARS-CoV-2, with the aim
of isolating infected people and thereby reducing transmission, has been under-
taken in hospitals [1], institutions [2,3], professional sports leagues [4] and the
White House. It has been undertaken at town and city level [5,6], with the aim
of expansion to national level [7]. This reduction in transmission aims not only
to save lives but also to permit continuance of activities that would otherwise be
halted as part of disease control efforts.
The success of such screening in reducing infections does not rely only upon
screening frequency, test sensitivity and viral shedding profiles. It encompasses
every element of the screening process, from those affecting whether people
with infection undergo screening, through the speed with which screening
can inform people they are infectious, to the actions people take on learning
they are infectious. Understanding the contributions from and interactions
between these elements is key to designing an effective screening programme.
Crucially, it is key for avoiding a programme that loses effectiveness or even
increases infection rates by allowing the wrong circumstances to come together.
We have derived an expression for the proportion of infections averted by a
screening programme. Our expression accounts for real-world engagement
with screening and the time taken to process samples. We show that in realistic
situations, screening (with isolation following a positive screen) alone results in
only a modest reduction in infections. When the presence of screening results in
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2this combination can result in an overall increase in infections
compared with no screening. We demonstrate that the suc-
cess of screening depends upon a rapid turnaround of tests.
As a result, we show that a screening programme running
comfortably under capacity is more successful than one that
pushes capacity and generates backlogs. Our derived
expression can be used to compare the effectiveness of pro-
posed testing strategies in complex scenarios where there
are different infection rates and different test availabilities—
such situations might occur in a small screening programme,
for example in a hospital with ward-to-ward variation in
infection, or in a large programme, for example in a national
programme with city-to-city variation in infection and in
laboratory locations.Figure 1. Behaviour changes in people with minor symptoms may negate
the effect of screening. Model output where the proportion of those devel-
oping minor symptoms (paucisymptomatic people) behaving as usual, rather
than isolating, is varied from 0 to 1, with parameters otherwise as in our
realistic scenario. There are two ways of viewing the effect of screening.
Firstly, one can just consider the effect of screening and isolation itself, so
that as fewer people isolate before being screened, there are more trans-
missions to interrupt and so screening appears to stop more transmissions
(‘apparent’ change in transmissions line, with number of transmissions in
absence of screening as denominator, showing estimated change in trans-
missions varying from −6.7% when all paucisymptomatic people isolate,
to −7.3% when all paucisymptomatic people behave as usual). Secondly,
one can consider changes in behaviour also to be part of the impact of
screening: in this case, the effect is the change in transmissions caused by
an increase in the proportion of paucisymptomatic people behaving as
usual from a fixed proportion (which we define to be zero, i.e. all paucisymp-
tomatic people isolating) and then screening and isolation of those not
already isolating (‘normalized’ change in transmissions line, with number
of transmissions in the absence of screening when all paucisymptomatic
people isolate as denominator, showing estimated change in transmissions
varying from −6.7% when all paucisymptomatic people continue to isolate,
to +13.7% when all paucisymptomatic people behave as usual). The com-
bined effect is at best a reduced effectiveness in screening, and at worst
an increase in the number of transmissions. (Note that the figure can be
redrawn with the ‘normalized’ line representing the change from a different
fixed proportion of paucisymptomatic people behaving as usual prior to the
introduction of screening, but that as long as screening causes the proportion
to increase, the overall result will still hold.)
R.Soc.Interface
18:202101642. Results
We began by considering two different screening scenarios.
The first scenario is an ideal (maximum impact) scenario. In
this scenario, screening is performed daily with a high-sensi-
tivity test. Test turnaround is rapid. All those eligible for
screening present on every occasion, and all those with posi-
tive screens immediately isolate. The second scenario is a
realistic scenario for mass population screening. In this scen-
ario, screening is performed weekly with a high-sensitivity
test. Samples for testing must be transported by courier
from the sampling site to the testing laboratory. Test turn-
around follows the distribution of real turnaround times
sampled from a large laboratory operating within capacity.
There is attrition reducing those eligible who present for
screening and those who isolate following positive screens,
similar to the attrition observed in other screening pro-
grammes. The difference between the two scenarios is
marked. In the ideal scenario, we estimate screening alone
can eliminate 70% of onward transmissions (95% confidence
interval 66–74%). In the realistic scenario, the proportion of
transmissions eliminated reduces to 7% (95% confidence
interval 5–11%).
We next considered what happens if the presence of
screening reassures those with minor symptoms, so that
instead of isolating they continue with their daily lives. We
divided our infected population into three categories: those
who never display any symptoms of infection and always
continue with their daily lives, those who display typical
symptoms and isolate as soon as these symptoms manifest,
and those who display minor symptoms and variably
reduce their contact with others when such symptoms mani-
fest. If, instead of isolating, those with minor symptoms
behave as usual, the total number of transmissions increases,
and because on average an infected person remains infectious
for longer (having not isolated), the proportion of trans-
missions eliminated by screening increases. However,
because screening does not identify all the additional individ-
uals in the population with minor symptoms but behaving as
usual, the net result is a relative increase in the number of
transmissions. If the behaviour change is seen in a sufficiently
high proportion of those with minor symptoms, the net result
of the screening programme can be an absolute increase in
transmissions compared with no screening programme,
even though the programme appears to be more successful
(figure 1).Following this, we considered the impact of testing turn-
around times on the ability of screening to reduce viral
transmission. In general, one would expect a greater number
of screening tests to be able to detect a greater number of
infections, and therefore to yield a greater reduction in trans-
missions. However, when the number of tests requested
exceeds a laboratory’s capacity, a backlog develops with conse-
quent increase in turnaround time. This effect was seen in
English laboratories at the end of April 2020, when a policy
of testing large numbers of asymptomatic people in residential
facilities was implemented. We modelled the effect of exceed-
ing laboratory capacity using turnaround time data from
April to June 2020 in our regional clinical microbiology and
public health laboratory in Cambridge, England (figure 2).
Our output shows that reliably keeping laboratory demand
slightly below capacity results in a greater reduction in trans-
missions than when capacity is exceeded. We then proceeded
to consider the general effect of laboratory turnaround time
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Figure 2. Turnaround time strongly impacts the success of screening. (a) Impact on transmissions of shortening the interval between screening tests, until, at a 5-
day interval, testing capacity is overwhelmed with an impact on turnaround time. The increased turnaround time results in delays in isolating infectious people and
a drastic loss in ability to prevent transmissions. (b) Comparison (hatched region) between the effects of normal (solid line) and impaired (dashed line) laboratory
turnaround times on transmission reduction, for varying screening intervals. (c) Impact on transmissions of offering weekly screening to an increasing population
proportion until, at 50%, testing capacity is overwhelmed with an impact on turnaround time. As in (a), the resultant delays to isolation cause a drastic loss in ability
to prevent transmissions. (d ) Comparison (hatched region) between the effects of normal (solid line) and impaired (dashed line) laboratory turnaround times on
transmission reduction, for varying proportions of the population offered screening. (e) Impact of turnaround time on transmission reduction. Here, rather than being
a distribution, total turnaround time from sampling to action on a positive result takes a single value, which is varied. ( f ) As (e) but using reported RNA detection
rates from the literature [8] rather than assuming the probability of detection scales with infectiousness. This shows the results are not an artefact of assuming





output shows that the extent of transmission reduction
depends strongly upon turnaround time.
A full consideration of screening effectiveness takes into
account individual engagement with screening. We con-
sidered this in our model, via the proportion of those
offered screening who ever take it up, the proportion of
those who attend each screening event, and the proportion
who isolate when asked. The first and last of these have a
linear effect on testing effectiveness (electronic supplemen-
tary material, figure S1). For a weekly screening interval,
the second is also approximately linear, reflecting that this
screening interval only gives one opportunity to prevent
most transmission. With more frequent screening intervals,
the impact on transmissions of increased per-screen uptake
becomes nonlinear, with diminishing returns as the uptake
is higher (figure 3).
Because ourmodel takes infectivity and testing distributions
as input, limited only by the tractability of the resultant numeri-
cal integration, it can be used to predict the impact of different
testing strategies in complex scenarios where rates of infection,
access to testing or uptake vary within a population (figure 4).
This allows us to, for example, consider the impact of a pro-
gramme using rapid near-patient tests daily, where such tests
have lower sensitivity than laboratory-based nucleic acid ampli-
fication testing [9]. Assuming total and per-test uptake remains
the same (increased frequency balanced by increased conven-
ience), our model predicts a reduction in transmissions from
such a programme between 25% for self-administered tests
and 32% for laboratory staff-administered tests (95% confidence
intervals 22–28% and 29–35%, respectively), compared with the
7% reduction (95% confidence interval 5–11%) from a
centralized mass testing programme.Our model is sufficiently robust to changes in modelling
assumptions regarding viral transmission dynamics to
make predictions that can be used in practice (electronic
supplementary material, table S1).3. Discussion
Ultimate control of the COVID-19 pandemic is unlikely prior
to deployment of effective vaccines. Screening and isolation
acts as a bridge to this goal, saving lives and permitting
some resumption of economic and social activity. It must,
however, be recognized that unintended behavioural
responses to screening may not only remove the opportunity
to resume desired activity, but indeed may make disease
transmission worse than if no screening had occurred.
Pursuing centralized testing strategies may rapidly
increase testing capacity. However, the critical impact of turn-
around time on testing effectiveness means that such
strategies must have highly streamlined logistics chains to
retain effectiveness. If rapid centralized turnaround of tests
is not possible, then less accurate, localized testing may be
more effective. As with the historical introduction of screen-
ing programmes, in SARS-CoV-2 testing it is crucial we
move from simply counting numbers of tests, to more
sophisticated measures of their effectiveness.
Engagement with screening substantially impacts success
and must not be taken for granted [10]. A holistic approach
considering the social, economic and political impacts,
acknowledging the incidence of false-positive results and
balancing their impact, and combined with good communi-
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Figure 3. Diminishing returns with increased uptake for short screening intervals. Model output showing change in transmissions as the proportion of those who
attend each offered screen (from those who engage in screening at least once) changes. (a) Weekly screening interval. (b) Daily screening interval. Model parameters





[11,12]. Testing strategies that employ confirmatory testing to
reduce false-positive rates need clear protocols for communi-
cating with those awaiting confirmatory testing, to retain the
benefit of earlier isolation.
Our results can only be as accurate as the estimates on
which our model is based (for example, of test sensitivity
and of duration of asymptomatic viral shedding). We note
that the exact values of these estimates depend upon under-
lying data that may depend upon population characteristics
and are sometimes sparse, but would anticipate our numeri-
cal results to covary with such estimates in a way that allows
comparison between different scenarios. The heterogeneity of
the underlying estimates makes the provision of meaningful
confidence intervals for derived results difficult. It is impor-
tant to understand that the main value of our results comes
from the insight yielded into which strategic decisions to
take when optimizing a screening programme, rather than
providing a before/after recipe of the effect of introducing
screening de novo. However, where inaccurate underlying
estimates limit the accuracy of our predictions, our model
highlights what additional information is required. (Our
model is also limited by numerical accuracy in the calcu-
lations, but the underlying estimates represent a greater
uncertainty.) In any case, our model demonstrates the
impact of the different modifiable factors in a screening pro-
gramme, enabling policymakers to prioritize those that give
most benefit. The code we have provided (electronic sup-
plementary material, code S1) can be updated with revised
estimates as more data become available.
Our study does not account for the potential impact on
transmission rate of isolating contacts of those who screen
positive. When screening itself does not identify all those
infected but not isolating, its impact can be potentiated by
isolating contacts or by targeting contacts for additional
screening as a higher risk group (similar to the scenario in
figure 4b). The impact of contact isolation on transmission
is highest at an intermediate screening impact, where screen-
ing is sufficiently impactful to identify many contacts to
isolate, but not sufficiently impactful to have prevented
most infections by itself (in the extreme case that screening
stops all infection, no contact tracing is necessary). As screen-
ing identifies more infectious individuals, both the scale
of contact tracing required and the impact from isolating
non-infectious contacts increase. As long as there is notcompetition for resources, the relative efficacy of screening
is not impacted by contact tracing (although if contact tracing
is successful, there should be fewer infectious individuals to
screen), so the approaches can be considered separately.
Our work allows policymakers to design SARS-CoV-2
screening programmes to maximize impact in reducing trans-
mission. While the data used pertain to SARS-CoV-2, the
underlying methodology is applicable to any transmissible
disease, and can therefore be applied to other epidemics
and pandemics.4. Methods
Our model considers the total infectivity of a population over a
period of time, and the proportion of this infectivity that is averted
by screening and isolating infectious people. The only major
assumption underlying the model is that those being offered
screening are representative of the overall population in terms
of potential infectiousness and behaviour: if this assumption
cannot be met, but the population can be broken down into sub-
populations where the assumption can be met, then the model
can still be used. In particular, we note that the model can be
used when the population is not static (individuals entering and
leaving the population), but in small populations where there is
substantial temporal clustering of both cases of infection and
screening events, the actual proportion of transmissions averted
may deviate substantially from the estimate.
Infectivity is deemed to end naturally at the end of asympto-
matic viral shedding, or when an individual develops symptoms
and isolates from others. We construct the model by starting with
a simplified screening scenario. We then add more realistic
components stepwise until we have reached the final model. Ulti-
mately, the model takes as input distributions of virus shedding
duration, infectivity, intervals between tests, testing turnaround
times, detection probabilities, and population engagement with
screening.
We begin by considering the scenario represented in
electronic supplementary material, figure S2. Asymptomatic/
presymptomatic shedding lasts for a duration m ∈M. It begins
during a screening interval of duration j ∈ J (in principle, succes-
sive screening interval durations can be drawn from different
distributions J2, J3,…). The shedding begins k ∈K time prior to
the end of the interval. There is a delay d∈D from the screening
event prior to isolating an infectious individual, reflecting the
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Figure 4. Screening in more complex scenarios. (a) Scenario where testing capacity is sufficient to offer screening to the whole population every 20 days (taking
non-attendance into account), and offering of tests is managed so as not to exceed capacity (a smaller proportion of the population is screened if testing is offered
more frequently than every 20 days). The proportion/frequency combination does not affect testing impact, except at the extremes where tests are not all used on
potentially infected individuals (right-hand side of plot: testing frequency is so low that some tests are unused; left-hand side of plot: testing frequency is so high
that some people offered tests have already tested positive and isolated in a preceding testing round). Note that the very small discontinuity of approximately 0.1%
near the 4-day interval in this and subsequent panels is a numerical artefact arising from the code implementation of the calculation; there is no reason to expect
such a discontinuity in a real-world setting. (b) As (a) but with the population structured: half the population has twice the risk of being infected as the other half
of the population. The higher risk portion of the population is prioritized for screening, with leftover tests at the chosen screening rate offered to the lower risk
portion. In this scenario, the greatest reduction in transmissions occurs when all tests are offered to the high risk portion. (c) As (b) but half of each portion of the
population are healthcare workers in contact with vulnerable patients, so are always screened before others, i.e. the screening priority is higher rate healthcare
workers, lower rate healthcare workers, higher rate others, lower rate others. Screening all those in contact with the vulnerable more often (10 day screening
interval) is possible at a cost of reduced efficacy of screening in the overall population. (d ) Scenario in which there are two identical cities with two identical
laboratories (realistic testing scenario), save that the first city has an infection prevalence greater than the second city. Laboratory capacity is sufficient to offer
screening to everybody every 10 days. Each city’s laboratory can be used separately to offer screening to its local population (dashed line). Alternatively, both
laboratories can be used to screen every 5 days those in the city with higher infection prevalence, but with an additional two-day turnaround delay for samples





There is a variable probability of transmission (relative infec-
tivity) during the asymptomatic/presymptomatic shedding
period. At its most general, this can be expressed as a normalized
force of infection g(t, τ), satisfying






g(t, t)fM(t) dtdt ¼ 1:
Here, fM is the probability density function for the shedding dur-
ation M, and t and τ parameterize the position within the
shedding period and the total duration of shedding, respectively.
With this definition, in the absence of screening the total normal-
ized infectivity is 1. The total normalized infectivity with
screening and isolation is therefore expressed as a proportion.
This proportion can be used as a coefficient to determine the
effect of screening on the reproduction number R. In this para-
digm, relative infectivity depends upon both position in the
shedding period and total duration of shedding: groups with
different shedding durations can have different total infectivities.g can be interpreted as a composite reflecting the average shed-
ding profile of an individual. The most obvious way in which
g can be seen to be a composite is that if the same shedding
period can represent both asymptomatic and presymptomatic
shedding, then g represents a composite of the two normalized
by their respective probabilities.
Next, we reflect that screening does not pick up all infectious
individuals by introducing a probability of detection pd(t, τ)∈ [0,
1]. This probability is allowed to depend on the total duration of
shedding (i.e. the total duration of shedding τ is used to parameterize
how easy it is to detect viral shedding at a given time t). It represents
a composite of the probability that an individual presents for screen-
ing, the sensitivity of the screening test, and the probability that the
individual isolates following a positive test. For nucleic acid amplifi-
cation testing for SARS-CoV-2, both g(t, τ) and pd(t, τ) are related to
viral shedding, and hence they are related to each other. However,
shedding of non-viable RNA later in the course of infection means
that pd(t, τ) tapers more slowly than g(t, τ) over time.
We now proceed to derive a generalized expression for the
relative infectivity in the presence of a given screening regimen.
First, we derive an expression for fK(x), the density function for




6We assume a constant hazard for the commencement of shed-
ding over time. This assumption is valid as long as screening
maintains an equilibrium of infections (there is not a large
growth or contraction in infection prevalence between successive
screens), and as long as the time of onset of infectiousness can be
assumed independent between individuals (true in all but very
small populations). Note, however, that the screening interval
length j can vary. This means that the time before the first
screen that shedding starts, K, is not simply distributed uni-
formly across the sampled screening interval j, but needs to be
conditioned upon the probability that shedding begins in a par-
ticular interval. For J
0
the distribution of the screening interval
length in which the shedding begins, we have
fJ0 (x)/ xfJ(x),
and by integrating both sides with respect to x we can derive the
constant of proportionality and conclude that
fJ0 (x) ¼ xfJ(x)
E(J)
:
















Now that we have a density function for the time from the start
of shedding to the next screen, we can write down a density
function for the time from the start of shedding to the time an












This convolution is independent of the total shedding duration.
However, its sampled value can exceed the total shedding dur-
ation, that is, shedding can have ended before it is possible to
act on a screening result.
We can now write down our first, simplified expression for
averted infectivity. In this simplified case, a screen always ident-
ifies an infectious individual, and that individual then perfectly
isolates. Conditioned upon a total shedding time τ, the normal-






where the min reflects the possibility of shedding having ended
prior to the screen.
Using g(x, τ) = 0 for x > τ we can expand the components of











fD(t y)g(x, t) dxdydt:
The total normalized infectivity averted from one infectivity-


















fD(t y)g(x, t) dxdydtdt:Next, we consider the situation where the probability that a
screen abolishes infectivity need not be 1. In this case, con-
ditioned upon an overall probability p∞ of ever detecting
infection in an individual given arbitrarily many tests over arbi-
trarily short testing intervals, a successful screen at time y occurs
with probability p(y, τ) and unsuccessful screens happen at time
a(1,1) = a1, a(1,2) = a1 + a2, a(1,3) = a1 + a2 + a3,… < ywith probabilities
1− p(a(1,1), τ), 1− p(a(1,2), τ), 1− p(a(1,3), τ),…. (In our earlier nota-
tion, pd(t, τ) = p∞p(t, τ).) Note that the length of shedding in the
interval before the first screen is still described by the random
variable K, but in subsequent intervals shedding occurs across
the entire interval unless it finishes altogether, so is described
by Ji, i ≥ 2. Electronic supplementary material, figure S3, gives
a schematic of this set-up to illustrate the notation used. Testing
turnaround time is only applicable after the last, successful,
screen. (If turnaround time is highly variable, it is in principle
possible to have two positive screens with the result of the
second available before the first. In practice, most laboratory
testing is first in, first out, so we neglect this possibility.)
For any given number of screens prior to successful detec-
tion, we can express the infectivity averted by taking a
convolution of the distributions of testing times as an extension
to the expression for fK+D(x). This yields a general expression
for the distribution of the time from beginning of shedding
(with total shedding length τ) to isolation of an individual with





















































































































 fJn (ya(1,n1))fD(ty)g(x,t)dxdan1dan2 ...da1dydtdt:
These integrals are high-dimensional, but we have successfully
implemented code to calculate them in Mathematica [13], using
its numerical integration algorithms. (We use the global adaptive




7implemented other methods in the code for cross-checking.) The
finite limits on many of the integrals, plus the ability to truncate
the infinite integral when the probability of shedding is low,
mean that the first few terms in the sum are computationally
tractable in full.
When successive screens are close together, so that multiple
terms in the sum become relevant, performing the full multi-
dimensional integrals becomes computationally intractable.
However, when the time between one screening opportunity
and the following opportunity is very similar for all indivi-
duals eligible for screening, the above convolutions can be
markedly simplified. The appropriate simplification is the
approximation fJi (t) ¼ d(t ti) for i≥ 2, where δ is the Dirac
delta and ti are fixed intervals between successive screens
(which may differ from each other). This allows reduction of











fM(t)p(y, t)(1 p(y t2, t)) 1 FJ(y t2)
E(J)
 




















fD(t y)g(x, t) dxdydtdt,where t(i,j ) is defined analagously to a(i,j ). In a programme under-
taking many screens at short intervals, this approximation is
likely to prove more accurate than early truncation of a series
containing the full, multiple-integral, terms. We note that the
approximation is better as p(t, τ) is more smooth, although the
variability in the time to initial sampling means that even
when p(t, τ) is rapidly varying, the approximation is still good
as long as the intervals between successive screens are similar.
4.1. Model parameters
To evaluate the effects of different screening scenarios, we
set parameters of the model according to estimates for SARS-
CoV-2 or the parameters we wished to evaluate. These are
described in detail in the electronic supplementary material.
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